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Abstract: This article argues that strategy practice and teaching are hindered by the prevailing monist 
paradigm that forms the structure of many strategy courses and text books. The power to generate 
valuable insight is diminished by selected elements from different ‘schools of thought’ being force fitted 
into a model at odds with practice. Differences in the fundamental underpinnings of theories, such as RBV, 
ABV and dynamic capabilities, and their recent developments, are often glossed over and this results in 
shallow application. However, in a turbulent world where traditional sources of advantage have waned, 
the insights that can be gained from the core theories have rarely been more needed. 
 
 
This article explores how a competitive pluralist approach, that values differences as much as 
consistencies, could bring the strengths of core theories back into strategy practice. It is argued that rather 
than adding complexity such an approach strips out the complication and confusion added by a flawed 
integration. As a result, deeper understanding and more robust strategic thinking is generated. In teaching 
the approach encourages greater critical thinking and analysis – core learning objectives for many 
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“I would not give a fig for simplicity this side of complexity but I’d give my life 
for the simplicity on the other side of complexity” (Oliver Wendel-Holmes Sr.1) 
 
 
In a drive for simplicity, the teaching of strategic management too often ignores divergences 
in the foundations of its major theories. This introduces fundamental flaws into student’s 
understanding of the subject and, consequently, sub-optimal application in practice. While 
strategy text books are often comprehensive, the rush to synthesis the work of notable 
strategy theorists into a unified rational/linear model - some ‘grand universal theory of 
everything’ - does a disservice to the subject.  
 
Typically, a paradigm of strategy practice is presented based on Kenneth Andrews’ 
framework within which students are urged to analyse the external environment – identifying 
opportunities and threats - and the firm’s internal capabilities for strengths and weaknesses 
(see Christensen, Andrews, Bower, Hamermesh and Porter 1982). Then, on the basis of this, 
develop options and choose a strategy(s) before spurring the firm into implementation. 
Typically, the 1980s work of Michael Porter will be highlighted in assessing opportunities 
and threats, and that of Resource-Based View (RBV) theorists (perhaps Barney 1991, 1995 or 
Prahalad and Hamel 1990) for appraising strengths and weaknesses. This is all despite the 
starting point for both these theories being that SWOT is well past its sell by date! (Porter 
1980, Barney 1991, Hill and Westbrook, 1997).  
 
1 Alternatively attributed to Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. and stated as “The only simplicity for which I would 
give a straw is that which is on the other side of the complex — not that which never has divined it.” In Oliver 
Wendell Holmes Jr.* (1961) Holmes-Pollock Letters: The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and Sir 
Frederick Pollock, 1874-1932″ (2nd ed., 1961), p. 109. 
 
 
In rushing to simplify, such an approach ignores both conflicting assumptions that underpin 
these theoretical frameworks (Barney and MacKey 2018) as well as recent developments in 
the thinking of the referenced theorists to reflect today’s competitive landscape (e.g., Porter 
1996, 2013). These short comings are particularly apparent in the treatment of competitive 
advantage. We can only assume this is the result of a fear that too much complexity will 
confuse students. But as the quote by Wendell-Holmes implies, simplicity that ignores 
complexity can be worthless and fake synthesis will degrade any value that could be gained. 
This situation is compounded by the waning in strength of traditional firm advantages in the 
face of changing competitive and technological landscapes. A new sharper approach is 
needed that harnesses the depth of thinking in core strategy theories while also matching the 
reality of strategy development in practice.  
 
In this article we will first look more deeply at theories of competitive advantage and how 
there are flaws in the standard paradigm explicitly or implicitly found in many strategy 
courses and text books. We will then consider how such coverage of business strategy is 
challenged by developments within key theories, especially if at odds with their core 
underpinnings. Finally, we will propose an alternative, competitive pluralist approach, that is 
arguably more suited to the needs of business today. 
 
WANING SOURCES OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
 
Twenty years ago, Christensen (2001) highlighted how factors that had traditionally been 
seen as sources of competitive advantage were losing their potency. In particular, the 
sustainability of advantage based on economies of scale and scope were questioned. In a 
world where fixed costs are avoidable via outsourcing, cost curves are flattened by flexible 
manufacturing and technology developments, and frequent changes hardly allow progression 
on any experience curve, we should not be surprised that scale alone does not guarantee a 
competitive edge. If advantage persists it is not about scale, but the nature of what you have 
scale in, that prevents, or at least delays, imitation.  
 
Others (e.g., D’Aveni 1994) show how Porter’s generic strategies of differentiation and cost 
leadership no longer fit today’s complex and fragmented markets. It is questionable if it was 
ever possible to gain a unique and defensible position on such a simplistic choice. Even more 
questionable once the need to choose was diluted by the introduction of ‘in-between’ hybrid 
positions such as ‘best-cost provider’. It is notable how more recently Porter himself has 
moved away from simple generic strategies to a more nuanced notion of choice in the “value 
proposition” 2 (Porter 1996 and 2013, Porter and Kramer 2006, Magretta 2012, 2020). 
 
With traditional recipes waning, the onus is on academics and practitioners to look more 
deeply at where competitive advantage originates. In this there is a need to fully recognise the 
different underpinnings of theoretical lenses and to avoid flawed and shallow attempts to 





2 In recent work Porter increasingly defines position in terms of choices in the “value proposition” - where the 
“value proposition” has three dimensions: which customers? which needs? and what relative price? – rather than 
pre-set generic strategies (cost leadership, differentiation and focus). Given the complexity of markets and 
consumer segmentation moving on from a small number of simple predefined generic strategies should come as 
no surprise.  
 
THE ALURE OF SIMPLIFICATION 
 
However, if we look at how business strategy is still taught - as represented in many strategy 
courses text books or requirements within professional qualification (e.g., CIMA or CMI) - 
we see these challenges have largely been unheeded. The lack of change has been a particular 
surprise to the author, having returned to academia and teaching after over 15 years as a 
strategy director and consultant. 
 
A review of popular text books supports De Witt’s (2017) view that the field of strategy 
education is “dominated by a strong industry recipe”. While many now recognise an 
emergent element in strategy development, text books continue to be underpinned by a 
uniform ‘strategic planning’ approach to business strategy (see Figure 1). Here elements of 
theory that match the prevailing standard paradigm are force fitted into a rational/linear 
model of strategy development. Typically, the understanding of opportunities and threats 
flow from an industry analysis (usually the 5-forces framework), while that of strengths and 
weaknesses result from an RBV appraisal (usually with the VRIN/VRIO framework) (Barney 
and Mackey 2018). In this the focus is on particular frameworks as simple tools and not the 




While the aim is to make the topic digestible though a set of easy-to-follow sequential steps 
(De Witt 2017) the result is to strip out much of the detail and internal consistency of 
individual theories – detail that has been long honed in each theory’s development. Often 
fundamentally different underlying assumptions between the theories are ignored or glossed 
over.  
 
BASIC BUILDING BLOCKS OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
 
The field of business strategy has many roots. The neo-classical view of economics, 
particularly the Chicago School of industrial organisation economics, can be seen to 
influences the work of Porter (Sheehan and Foss 2009, Ghoshal 2005). Others like Penrose, 
Schumpeter and even Marx are the origins of the resource-based view and dynamic 
capabilities. Thinkers in sociology and psychology, such as Simon, March and Granovetter, 
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strategy3. These different influences mean that different assumptions lie at the core of the 
different ‘schools of thought’ on where competitive advantage originates.  
 
The importance of these differences has grown as Porter’s thinking has moved on from the 
simple choice of a ‘generic strategy’ to what could now be called “the activity-based view” 
(Sheehan and Foss 2009). We cannot simply allocate Porter to the analysis of the external 
environment (opportunities and treats) and RBV (often blurred with dynamic capabilities) to 
an internal perspective (strengths and weaknesses).  
 
Resources or Activities? 
It is not as if the differences between theories are nuances. The different theoretical 
underpinnings mean fundamental disagreements - even on what is the basic building block of 
competitive advantage and, therefore, of business strategy - are overlooked.  
 
For Porter the focus is on activities - or more precisely ‘value activities’4 (Porter 1985) – the 
things the firm does and how it does them. Sustained advantage results from making a choice 
of industry position and aligning the organisation’s whole system of activities. Advantage is 
sustained, at least over the foreseeable future, because of the inability of others to match any 
trade-off choices5 and to imitate the complex, tuned system of activity choices that is needed 
to deliver the chosen position6.  
 
In contrast, advocates of the resource-based view see lasting advantage gained from the 
ownership of, or at least control of, certain resources that competitors do not have and cannot 
economically obtain7. Advantage stems from the firm’s possession of these resources rather 
than from what you do with/to them (i.e., the firm’s activities).  
 
Influenced by its neoclassical economics underpinnings, the assumption in Porter’s theory is 
that the future value of a resource will be reflected in the price and, therefore, advantage must 
be accrued through the activities that use or change resources (Porter 1991)8. In contrast, 
RBV theorists, such as Barney (1991) and Wernerfelt (1984), influenced by Penrose (1959) 
follow a Ricardian line of imperfections in resource markets (Barney and Clark 2007, Barney 
and MacKey 2018). Competitors are unable to obtain resources that allow you to do things 
others cannot, and so provide a sustained economic advantage. Barney (1991) highlights how 
historic circumstances, social complexity or causal ambiguity create market conditions where 
a resource cannot be imitated.   
 
The assumption of an imperfect market for resources is also apparent in Prahalad and 
Hamel’s (1990) notion of core competencies. Competencies are presented as discrete bundles 
 
3 At the heart, Blue Ocean Strategy is Kim and Mauborgne’s (2005) research on the process used to break free 
of the current dominant paradigm in an industry/firm. Teece also recognises the role of bounded rationality in 
thinking on dynamic capabilities with the suggestion it was already present in Schumpeter’s theory of 
innovation (Augier and Teece 2009) 
4 Arguably these are better seen as “activity choices” when applying Porter’s theory 
5 A trade-off choice exists where choosing one option prevents you also choosing another option even though 
the alternative might lead to valid revenue streams. Hence to match the strategic position a competitor has to 
make the same choice and in doing so, potentially, let go of existing customers.   
6 Sheehan and Foss (2009, p255) quote Porter as stating that activities are “the causal, first-order unit of analysis 
where choices need to be made and where advantage” arises, while “resources or KSFs are outcomes …and 
work through the activities a firm performs”  
7 Barney and Mackey (2018) distinguish between monopoly and efficiency profits underpinning Porter’s and the 
RBV theories respectively and hence “these two theories, far from being complements, are, on the whole, 
substitutes”  
8 This is also apparent in Porter’s (1985) discussion on technology 
 
of resources where the particular combination of resources, and the ability to integrate them 
together, act as high barriers to imitation9. Where a competency provides access to multiple 
markets, makes a significant contribution to perceived customer benefits and is difficult to 
imitate, it is classified as a ‘core competency’ and seen as giving the firm advantage 
(Prahalad and Hamel 1990)10. Importantly a competency is still a resource and hence this 
view shares the underpinnings of those of Barney and other RBV theories. 
 
Thus, between the ‘ABV’ and the ‘RBV’ schools of thought there is a fundamental 
disagreement about the basic building block of competitive advantage and strategy. Yet a 
difference that is often glossed over in strategy text books (Barney and Mackey 2018). When 
activities and resources are mentioned, for example, in the presentation and use of Porter’s 
value chain, the distinction is often ignored and they are treated interchangeably (Sheehan 
and Foss 2007). 
 
Stable or Dynamic? 
Similar issues exist in the strategy text book’s treatment of the distinction between RBV and 
the dynamic capabilities view. Dynamic capabilities, if covered, are positioned as a 
development in response to the criticism that RBV is too static - particularly in turbulent and 
high velocity markets. However, this overlooks their fundamentally different theoretical 
underpinnings. The RBV has its foundations in Ricardian economics – so an equilibrium 
view – while dynamic capabilities theorists see this view stemming for the disequilibrium 
stance taken by Hayek or Schumpeter (Barney 2001, Teece 2007).  
 
While the dynamic capabilities and the resource-based views do share a focus on competitive 
advantage stemming from resources, they disagree on what it takes to sustain that advantage. 
In contrast to RBV, from the dynamic capabilities’ perspective, continued advantage comes 
 
9 Prahalad and Hamel (1990) leave room for interpretation on what a competency is. At various points they 
describing them as: ‘the collective learning in the organisation’; ‘ability to consolidate corporate-wide 
technologies and production skills’; ‘harmonizing streams of technology’; ‘the glue that binds together 
businesses’ and even ‘communication, involvement and a deep commitment to working across organisational 
boundaries’. Although they are clear that competencies are not shared costs, common facilities or functions, 
products, components or sub-assemblies, nor technologies.  Subsequent publications (e.g., Hamel and Prahalad 
1994) offer further hints: “the need to specifically name the competency and precisely define what is included in 
it” and “the need to identify the elements that contribute to each competency (e.g., technologies, expertise, 
discreet skills, people)” (p225/6); and avoid a ‘lengthy laundry list of skills, technologies and capabilities’ 
(p224). Hamel (1994) describes a competency as a “bundle of constituent skills and technologies rather than a 
single, discrete skill or technology” and, as “the integration of a variety of individual skills” (p11). He suggests a 
hierarchy of competencies with examples for FEDEX: “meta-competencies” (e.g., logistics), [potential] “core 
competencies” (e.g., package tracking competency) and “constituent skills” (e.g., barcoding ability) (p12). 
Although, he also says a core competency is an activity rather than an asset – although this seems to be a loose 
use of this term and at odds with the examples and terms he uses elsewhere.  
Across subsequent literature you can see a competency (sometimes named capability) both as an integrated 
bundle of resources with internal complementarity (Milgram and Roberts 1995), that includes the ability to bind 
those resources together; or as just the ability to marshal the resources in a specific way (e.g., Eisenhardt and 
Martin 2000). As a practitioner it is questionable if we should worry about this nuance – after all to gain value 
you need both! The critical issue is whether the competency is imitable either as a whole and can’t be broken 
down into parts which can then be copied. Seeking integrated bundles that enable the firm to deliver to 
stakeholder, perhaps aided by Fowler, King, Marsh and Victor’s (2000) typology of competencies 
(technological, market-based and integration) or Hamel’s (1994) equivalent further aids competency 
identification, helps identify relevant competencies that can then be tested using the VRIO/VRIN test. 
10 Prahalad and Hamel’s tests are a more practical way of identifying competencies than attempting to map all 
the resources in a firm and work out how they integrate into competencies. The starting point is why do 
customers come to the firm and then identifying competencies that enable this, rather than as many text books 
suggest (e.g., Grant and Jordan 2015), trying to sieve through all the resources the firm possesses, perhaps using 
Porter’s value chain. 
 
from the organisations ability to create an ongoing series of resource advantages (Helfat, 
Finkelstein, Mitchell, Peteraf, Singh, Teece and Winter 2007). The firm accesses 
opportunities effectively before others and moves on to the next opportunity before the 
original advantage is competed away (Teece and Pisano 1994, Wang and Ahmed 2007, 
Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). To achieve this the firm deliberately – and to some extent 
formally - puts in place specific processes11 to manage its resource portfolio (Eisenhardt and 
Martin 2000). Mechanisms that purposefully support the firm’s capability to learn and absorb 
knowledge, reconfigure/transform the firm’s resources and manage the exploitation of the 
advantage while it lasts (Teece and Pisano 1994, Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997, Ambrosini 
and Bowman 2009, Wang and Ahmed 2007 Augier and Teece 2009)12. 
 
Teece and Pisano (1994) and Teece et al (1997) argue that “competitive advantage lies in 
these managerial and organisational processes” and these are “shaped by the firm’s asset 
position and the paths available to it” (Teece et al 1997, p518). Here asset position refers to 
difficult-to-trade knowledge, reputational and relational resources with which the firm is 
endowed, rather than non-specialised assets such as plant and machinery. The paths a firm 
can then take are dependent on its resource endowment and its history (previous decisions 
asymmetrically build knowledge, resources and ingrained behaviours). So, the firm is both 
rewarded and constrained by its heritage (Teece 2007)  
 
There are however different views on the nature of these organisational processes among 
proponents of the dynamic capabilities perspective. Teece and colleagues (Teece and Pisano 
1994, Teece et al 1997, Teece 2007, Schoemaker, Heaton and Teece 2018) argue that the 
relevant mechanisms are “signature” processes, that are hard to develop and deploy, and 
hence difficult for rivals to imitate. They are often tacit and, having emerged through the 
firm’s unique history, baked into the organisation’s culture (Schoemaker et al 2018). In this 
claim we see resonance with the RBV perspective – competitive advantage is sustained as a 
result of valuable, rare and inimitable resources (processes are still resources possessed by the 
firm).  
 
In contrast, Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) and Galunic and Eisenhardt 2001) argue that the 
processes within dynamic capabilities are well known practices, such as product 
development, alliancing, strategy processes and R&D. While in stable markets, such 
processes could become complex and idiosyncratic, in dynamic, high-velocity markets they 
are simplistic, experiential and unstable (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, p 1106) 13. Thus, at 
best, only temporary advantage can be gained from their possession. Instead, it is the acts of 
will and leadership that creates and exploits temporary resource advantages14. The active 
 
11 Care here is needed on terminology. The word “routines” is often used instead of processes (used 
interchangeably here with mechanisms) but as Teece et al (1997 p 520) warn there is a danger the term ‘routine’ 
being “too amorphous”. Indeed, a routine can be seen as a resource or a repeated activity and there is, therefore, 
a potential blurring with both Porter’s ABV theory and the resource-based view. Specifically, in dynamic 
capabilities there needs to be a focus is on processes that act on the portfolio of competencies and resources – to 
integrate, reconfigure and release resource (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). Note in this they are not part of a 
specific competency but act on the portfolio of competencies and resources. 
12 Elsewhere described as sensing (learning), Seizing (integrating and coordinating) and transformational meta-
capabilities (Teece 2007). 
13 Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) argue that such processes are achieved through many different paths and are 
fungible across different contexts (p1110) 
14 Thus, while such processes will certainly be valuable there is no requirement for them to be rare or inimitable. 
It is how they are consistently and effectively used in the management of the firm’s resource portfolio. 
Although, of course, some of the competencies/resources that are created and managed will be rare and give 
temporary advantage. 
 
intent is thus observed in behaviours and the comprehensiveness of the mechanisms put in 
place even if they are ad-hoc (e.g., processes to generate real-time information, cross-
organisational communication and relationships, and multi-streamed experimentation). There 
is a conscious emphasis on the adaptive, absorptive and innovative capacities of an 
organisation in balancing knowledge exploration and exploitation (Wang and Ahmed 2007, 
March 1991) - rather than on signature routines. Therefore, the challenge is in overcoming 
cognitive limits and internally sustaining that effort, rather than from external erosion of a 
unique capability (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000, p1113).  
 
Arndt and Pierce (2018) suggest that these contrasting views stem from a duality within 
Schumpeter’s work. They argue that Eisenhardt and Martin (2000), being influenced by Cyert 
and March (1963), pick up an organisational behavioural strand, while Teece and colleagues 
take an entrepreneurial capabilities line of thinking15. However, other than R&D, Schumpeter 
(in Mark I or Mark II) does not explore specific internal firm processes. Instead, his 
emphasises is on how capitalism promotes entrepreneurial mentalities and behaviour16. We 
can also challenge if a focus on unique ‘signature’ processes - that provide sustainable 
competitive advantage - is in effect an equilibrium view17 and so part of RBV rather than a 
Schumpeterian view18. A true disequilibrium perspective would suggest that even such an 
advantage will always be imitated or become obsolete. As such, it can be argued that 
Eisenhardt and Martin’s (1990) view is more in accord with a disequilibrium view19. To a 
degree, Teece (2007) moves closer to this interpretation - seeing success as driven by “an 
intensely entrepreneurial genre of management constantly honing the evolutionary and 
entrepreneurial fitness of the enterprise” (p1346).  
 
Although innovation and strategic change are addressed in most strategic management text 
books, specific theories that take a dynamic perspective on competitive advantage receive 
superficial coverage. Where dynamic capabilities are mentioned, they are usually positioned 
as an extension of RBV - with the mechanisms potentially being rare and inimitable20. So, the 
earlier Teece and colleagues’ viewpoint with the relevant processes being idiosyncratic and 
inimitable and, therefore, directly the source of sustainable competitive advantage (Barney 
and Mackey 2018). In this there is a significant, and potentially confusing, blurring of the 
dynamic capabilities perspective with the RBV theory and even, if care is not taken in the use 




15 Arndt and Pierce’s (2018) claim the concept of entrepreneurial capabilities is rooted in Schumpeter’s Mark II 
theory – the term given to his thinking developed in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Schumpeter 1943) 
and where Schumpeter broaden his thinking to the role of “big business” rather than the S-entrepreneur 
(Andersen2012). They also claim a similar duality in Nelson and Winter’s (1982) evolutionary view of 
economic change. The views of Teece and colleagues are then categorised as ‘evolutionary’ and contrasted to 
the ‘behavioural’ view of Eisenhardt and Martin. 
16 What Cantwell (200/2001) terms the creation of a social capability that enables firms to experiment with new 
technological combinations and solve the problems that arise in doing so, hence learn and successfully innovate 
in production.  
17 Or from a Kirznerian view point of the firm seeking to restore equilibrium (Kirzner 1973) 
18 Suggesting profits stem from a monopoly in the possession of certain routines giving market power rather 
than the process of innovation – so is attempting to marry an equilibrium view with a disequilibrium 
perspective. In economics Cantwell (2000/2001) terms this the erroneous ‘Schumpeter hypothesis’. Interestingly 
Kuznets (1940) and Freeman (1990) suggest Schumpeter made a similar error in his 1939 book, Business Cycles 
(also see Andersen 2012).  
19 Teece and Pisano (1994, p553) accept that here there is a divergence from Schumpeter’s thinking. 
20 The focus is simply on a different type of resource that is more difficult to imitate due to influence of path 
dependency and resource endowment (effectively the historic circumstances through which it was gained)  
 
A Dynamic View of Activities 
The authors of Blue Ocean strategy take a similar dynamic view of gaining competitive 
advantage. Also highlighting the influenced of Schumpeter, Kim and Mauborgne (2005 
p245) lay out what they claim is a ‘reconstructionist’ view with, at its core, a process by 
which firms “create new market space”. This ‘value innovation’ view focuses on the process 
of changing ‘competing factors’ to more closely match what customers really need21. In the 
examples given by Kim and Mauborgne ‘competing factors’ are the things the firm does. 
Thus, the focus is on activity choices, rather than resources. This stress on activities is even 
more emphasised in Blue Ocean Leadership (Kim and Mauborgne 2014) where the Blue 
Ocean process is applied to what leaders do – the ‘acts and activities’ - not what traits they 
possess. Firm competitive advantage comes from changing the “entire system of a company’s 
activities” with organisational and cognitive barriers then making it hard for others to quickly 
match that strategic move (Kim and Mauborgne 2004, 2005)22. 
 
A focus on changing activities is also evident in Williamson’s ‘economising’ orientation to 
strategy23. Here Hayek and Bernard provide the underpinnings, and success is seen as the 
result of rapid adaptation to changing market circumstances (Williamson 1991).  A key 
element here is the ongoing elimination of waste, with Williamson arguing that excess cost is 
due to inferior organisation and maladapted operations (Williamson 1991 p78). One firm will 
out-perform another due its activities being better aligned to internal and external interfaces. 
Thus, firms gain advantages through innovation and cutting waste. However, advantage is 
short lived, with more durable advantage undone by inevitable imitation – through 
“Schumpeter’s process of ‘handing on” (Williamson 1991, p80).    
 
With the emphasis on continual economising, innovating and eliminating waste there are 
strong parallels to Kim and Mauborgne’s (2005) “eliminate, reduce, raise and create’ mantra 
– although in more incremental steps. This value innovation (or perhaps value activity 
innovation) view can also be seen in other innovation linked strategy literature such as 
‘disruptive innovation’ (Christensen, Raynor and McDonald 2015), ‘hyper-competition’ 
(D’Aveni 1994), the ‘flexible firm’ (Volberda 1998, Lewin and Volberda 1999) and ‘co-
creation’ (Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2004).  
 
At the core of these “value activity innovation” theories is a dynamic view on how firm’s 
gain competitive advantage that is at odds with Porter. Both Kim and Mauborgne and 
Williamson are critical of the view that position choice, especially Porter’s generic strategies, 
is central to strategy – at least for all but a few fortunate organisations. With the focus on 
activities, they also differ from the resource-based and dynamic capabilities views. However, 
when they are picked up in strategy courses and text books they are often simply presented as 
part of the implementation stages of the traditional strategy paradigm - a way to change a 
strategic (equilibrium) position. Little coverage is therefore given to the assumptions they 
make about the source of competitive advantage.  
 
A Shifting Landscape  
We cannot expect theories of competitive advantage (or any other topic) to be set in stone and 
in their development, some blurring of the original theoretical position will ensue. This 
should not be surprising given the ontological stance taken by many western management 
 
21 So, in contrast to Porter’s stress on choice of customers in his value proposition concept and certainly at odds 
with his earlier notion of generic strategies. 
22 Others, such as Christensen (e.g., Christensen et al2015), might ask why these same organisational and 
cognitive barriers don’t stop any incumbent from making such moves even if following the Blue Ocean process.    
23 Note this is a dynamic view captured in the use of the term economising – it implies an on-going activity 
 
researchers. A theory emerges, develops and gains attention. It attracts valid practical and 
theoretical criticism and in response the theory is modified to increase generalisability or, at 
least, is adjusted to nullify the criticism24. 
 
For example, Porter (1980) introduces his concept of generic strategies, this was picked up in 
practice and teaching, but it became apparent that there were firms that succeed despite being 
“stuck in the middle”, so for a while the notion of “best price provider” emerges. Later Porter 
(1996) adds additional “strategic positions” and then in the 2000s and 2010s begins to shift to 
more nuanced synthesis (i.e., value proposition, trade off choices and activity systems). 
While apparently reluctant to jettison the now famous generic strategies, they play a fading 
role in his presentations and publications and are largely ignored in the summaries of his 
work that he supports (e.g., Magretta 2012, 2020). 
 
While Porter’s explanation of 3rd order fit – the optimisation of the form’s activity system - 
appears to hedge to a more dynamic perspective (Porter 1996), for the most part, the theory’s 
trajectory has re-emphasised the view that choice and alignment of activities is the route to 
sustainable competitive advantage (Porter 1996, 2015).  
 
At the same time Kim and Mauborgne (2004, 2015) have grappled with the question of how 
you ensure a ‘Blue Ocean move’ is sustainable and as a result added new sections in the 2015 
edition of their book Blue Ocean Strategy. In addition to the cognitive barriers discussed in 
the first edition, they argue that “sustainable blue ocean is in the alignment of the three 
propositions” - the value, profit and people propositions (Kim and Mauborgne 2015). So, 
despite retaining some criticisms of Porter, a significant convergence especially with his 
recent work. This despite there still being radically different underpinnings of these two 
views on competitive advantage. Seemingly blurring a neoclassical economics’ view 
underpinned by the notion of a stable equilibrium with Schumpeter’s evolutionary view with 
innovation driving disequilibrium (Nelson and Winter 1982).  
 
There is a recognised lack of standardisation in the terms used among RBV theorists but in 
addition we also see variations in theoretical position. True to its underpinning assumptions, 
Barney’s 1991 article comprehensively lays out the perspective taken and introduces the 
VRIN test (Valuable, Rare, Inimitable and Non-Substitutable). The focus is on how 
possession of heterogenous and immobile firm resources allow a firm to implement a value 
creating strategy that others cannot (Barney 1991) and why these may not be duplicated in 
the foreseeable future. Indeed, as he explains, competitors have ceased in their attempts to 
imitate or substitute these resources. So, an equilibrium position has been attained. Hence the 
emphasis is on what resources the firm already possesses and how this view informs strategic 
choices25.  
 
However, four years later Barney modifies his test to determine whether a resource is a 
source of competitive advantage: VRIN becomes VRIO. The inimitability and non-
substitutable elements merge and the ‘question of organisation’ is added (Barney 1995). “To 
fully realise [advantage] the firm must […..] be organised to exploit its resources and 
capabilities”. Thus, the firm needs to possess “complementary resources” such as a formal 
reporting structure, control systems and compensation policies (p56). Note here Barney is 
 
24 See Kapeller (2020) for a discussion on axiomatic variation within economics – i.e., changes in the underlying 
assumptions underpinning a model or theory 
25 The system is in equilibrium and insight comes from understanding that equilibrium   
 
careful to remain focused on resources26, but there is a subtle shift towards how the firm 
exploits its resources rather than just possession providing advantage. This development is 
more marked in the supporting notes where links are made to literature that takes a 
Schumpeterian evolutionary (disequilibrium) view (e.g., Teece, 1986) and focuses on the 
creation of new resource advantages (e.g., Dierickx and Cool, 1989).         
 
In responding the criticisms of Priem and Butler (2001), Barney’s (2001) recognises these 
contrasting underpinnings27. He highlights the value of taking an ‘equilibrium’/Ricardian 
perspective seen in his 1991 article and how his differs from the ‘evolutionary’/ 
Schumpeterian view of others (e.g., Teece and Pisano 1994). There is a recognition of the 
limitations of the equilibrium view but a stress on its value in generating insight. 
 
Prahalad and Hamel go even further in straddling equilibrium and disequilibrium viewpoints. 
Much of Core Competence of the Corporation (Prahalad and Hamel 1990) and subsequent 
publications (e.g., Hamel and Prahalad 1993, 1994) focus on how a firm develops, deploys 
and redevelops competencies to sustain advantage - with their concepts of stretch, leverage 
and strategic architecture. It is the firm’s capacity to learn and unlearn (Hamel and Prahalad 
1994), allocate competencies and develops new competencies that sustains advantage. This 
clearly overlaps with the dynamic capabilities’ viewpoint on competitive advantage28. 
 
Four Schools of Thought in Flux 
Thus, we can decern four very different evolving schools of thought on business strategy that 
hold very different opinions on what is the basic building block of competitive advantage. 
Each takes a divergent view on whether the source of advantage is the activities within firm 
or the resources it possesses; and whether that advantage is stable over the foreseeable future 
or is fleeting. These differences stem from fundamentally opposing stances found in the 
foundations of each theory e.g., a neo-classical economics equilibrium or Schumpeterian 




26 A reporting structure, compensation policies and control systems are still resources even if it is unlikely that 
they would not be rare and/or inimitable 
27 Also see Barney and Clark (2007) 
28 A similar observation can be made regarding the knowledge-based view of competitive advantage. Here the 
premise is that specific knowledge held by the firm is unique and immobile and hence its possession confers 
advantage. However, although the divide is rarely stated, in most of the literature the focus is on how the firm 
gains, socialises and institutionalises knowledge and then exploits it – so a dynamic perspective. 
29 Following Nelson and Winter (1982) you would also describe schools of thought that envisage a stable source 
of competitive advantage as ‘value maximising’ (usually profit). Managers are seeking where to maximise the 
value from unique resources or how do you protect above average profits in an industry position. In contrast a 
dynamic view has at its core value seeking. In a changing environment the firm looks for new streams of value 




In addition, understanding of the various theories is challenged by them being in a state of 
flux. At different times, diverging and converging as authors seek to clarify their thinking, 
respond to critics and create a wider synthesis. This results in increased complexity and a 
blurring of the distinctiveness of individual theories. 
 
We can depict the different schools of thought in a simple 2x2 and, based on the preceding 
discussion, schematically show the position taken by different theorists (see Figure 3). In this 
we can also illustrate the blurring of positions we have noted (e.g., the differing Teece and 
Eisenhardt views of dynamic capabilities, Kim and Mauborgne’s concern with sustainability 




Hence the field of strategy offers a range of rich views on competitive advantage that are 
based on fundamentally different assumptions and long academic heritages. Naturally, in 
presenting the topic to practitioners and students, ways to simplify will be sought - hopefully 
providing ‘simplification beyond complexity’. Although this task is undoubtedly challenged 
by each theory’s ongoing evolution – especially if these developments are not consistent with 
its original underpinnings. 
 
 
However, as we have seen the prevailing traditional strategy paradigm presents at best a 
partial synthesis. In retaining the notion of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats 
within a linear process, it selectively combines individual frameworks despite fundamental 
differences in their theoretical underpinnings (Barney and MacKey 2018). With SWOT 
thinking still often implicitly at its core, the view presented is inherently static and, as we 
have seen, attempts to incorporate dynamic (disequilibrium) theories of competitive 
advantage have been superficial. Either defaulting to an equilibrium perspective or presenting 
such thinking as a way to step between equilibrium positions.  
 
With an emphasis on presenting a single framework/theory to separately address the internal 
and external context of strategy, there appears to have been a reluctance to fully incorporate 
new theory development, even when these are major overhauls by key contributors (also see 
Barney and Mackey 2018, Bell et al 2018). Developments driven by a quest to more 
effectively reflect the reality of strategic management. For example, despite developments in 
Porter’s thinking in the late 1990s and more recently, his 1980’s concept of simplistic generic 
strategies still dominates, and then as guidance given on strategy content rather than an 
alternative to RBV30.  
 
It would appear that by seeking to simplify and provide a simple recipe, a Frankenstein’s 
monster emerges, in which individual theories are stripped of their precision and richness31. 
Striped of the match to real-life strategy-making, the insights produced from application are 
often insipid and shallow. If as it appears, what we teach is actually bad for practice, it is not 
surprising that some question the value of teaching strategy theory (March 2006, Ghoshal 
2005, Bell, Filatotchev, Krause and Hitt 2018). It would seem we have been guilty of 
simplifying on the wrong side of complexity! 
 
 
A CASE FOR THE CRITICAL REALIST PRACTITIONER? 
 
With the current paradigm commonly found in many textbooks seemingly at odds with the 
underpinnings and developments of the theories it tries to marshal, is there a more effective 
approach? An approach that mobilises the richness and depth of individual theories about 
competitive advantage despite their inherent differences? A solution lies in challenging other 
pillars of the prevailing standard paradigm, in particular the notion of a sequential and 
rational32 strategy process.  
 
As anyone who has ever been involved in the development of strategy will have experienced, 
it is anything but a linear process of analysis, formulation, implementation and evaluation 
depicted in the standard paradigm. Although deliberate elements are present, the process is 
messy, episodic and often emergent. This does not mean organisations are bad at strategy, 
this is the very nature of human sensemaking and decision-making and the inherent 
uncertainty and complexity involved in strategy-making. This observation is not new, it is 
widely reported in research on strategy process and practice going back decades (March and 
 
30 Seemingly the field has a track record of being slow to change. 20 years ago, Schneider and Lieb (2004) were 
advancing the integration of RBV in the teaching of strategy and highlighting the field’s resistance to change in 
teaching 
31 Barney and Mackey (2018) show how the combination of the SCP paradigm underpinning Porter’s 5-forces 
and RBV damages the insight that can be gained. They argue that to maintain the “grand integrated framework” 
(the standard paradigm) you may effectively return to the “comparative list making exercise that dominated 
SWOT thinking in the 1970s and is still practiced in some circles” (p367) 
32 Rational in the sense defined by March (1994) – defined by “procedural rationality” 
 
Olsen 1976, Quinn 1978, Mintzberg and Waters 1985, Cray, Mallory, Butler, Hickson and 
Wilson 1991, Mintzberg 1994, Weick 1995, Eisenhardt 1999, Sull 1999, Webb and Pettigrew 
1999, Elbanna 2006, Whittington 2006, Powell 2017). 
 
Strategy development is more realistically seen as an ongoing reflective conversation 
(Morgan 1983) where the strategy-making group seeks to converge on a shared view of the 
future and how to get there given prevailing institutional constraints33. Rather than some 
strategy framework, it is the ‘collective intuition’ of the strategy-making team that emerges 
from this conversation that guides cohesive sets of deliberate and emergent actions, and 
reactions, across the organisation (Eisenhardt 1999).  
 
If real strategy-making is iterative and messy, why do we prune stand-alone theories and 
force fit them into a simplistic process that does not match reality? And if the purpose of 
strategy frameworks is to provide insight that becomes part of an ongoing conversation, why 
would we want just one perspective, especially if it results in emasculated versions – pale 
imitations - of carefully honed theories being deployed? Would it not better to separately 
apply different, internally consistent, theoretical lenses to “open windows onto the world” 
(Clegg, Pitelis, Schweitzer and Whittle 2020, p43) and then look for synthesis in the strategic 
decisions to which the insights generated are input? 
 
This raises questions about the epistemological underpinnings of strategic management. In 
research on strategy a realist and positivist ontology and epistemology has tended to be the 
norm (Mir and Watson 2000, 2001, Kwan and Tsang 2001). However, there are alternative 
views:  Mir and Watson highlight the value in a constructivist underpinning while Kwang and 
Tsang champion a critical realist ontology. Powell (2001) suggests that strategy research is 
better informed by a pragmatist epistemology. He argues that while research is often 
described in positivist terms, reality is more subjective with theories, such as RBV, often just 
statements of “ideology, dogmatism or faith”.  
 
Despite some diversity in research, the traditional paradigm seen on many strategy courses 
and in text books suggests that a positivist epistemology dominates teaching in strategic 
management (Schneider and Lieb 2016, Powell 2001) 34. Students are expected to logically 
and rationally work though context analysis, option identification and choice to arrive at an 
effective strategy. Sequentially using the prescribed frameworks as the ‘right way’ to do that 
part of the process. The belief is instilled that, by following this process, the firm gains 
competitive advantages and this will drive superior financial performance (Powell 2001). 
 
While such a paradigm brings apparent simplicity to strategy education, its monism 
discourages critical thinking and analysis – despite these rightly being key learning objectives 
of management courses (Alstete and Beutell 2016, De Witt 2017, Albert and Grzeda 2015, 
Dow 2020).  This is hardly a route to developing the critical and open-minded graduates who 
can cope with the ambiguity and often conflicting opinions that characterise strategic 
decisions (Emami and Riordan 1998, Schneider and Lieb 2004, Albert and Grzeda 2015, Bell 
 
33 Although formal plans are generated when required (usually annually) these are not the end point in the 
strategy process, they are outputs that capture the current “best thinking” of the strategy at that time. As Kaplan 
and Beinhocker (2003) argue, the key value of the planning process is in the learning it generates and as a way 
of gaining input, understanding and commitment from across the organisation 
34 Also see Glynn, Barr and Dacin (2000) on how organizational theorists – including strategy theorists – tend to 
homogenize what is a pluralistic world – giving emphasis to unifying principles while overlooking differences. 
The result being a lack of accuracy and realism. 
 
et al 2018)35. Strategy practice need individuals who thrive where success often lies in the 
mobilisation of stakeholders rather than some notion of absolute rightness. As Feyerabend 
(2010) warns, uniformity endangers the free development of the individual. 
 
However, the strategies developed do need to link to very real choices, even if complexity 
and uncertainty prevents us fully perceiving their nature and the paths open to the 
organisation. Students and managers do, therefore, need to be able to access and effectively 
use tools that allow them to arrive at the best possible understanding (Emami and Riordan 
1998). This combination of an objective reality, but one which is multifaceted and difficult to 
decipher, implies that strategy practice and education may be better underpinned by a 
pluralist epistemology and critical realist ontology.  
 
 
PLURALISM IN APPLICATION 
 
For some time, pluralism has been a growing area of interest across a range of areas of 
business-related research including organisation design (Morgan 1983), management science 
(Jackson 1999) and economics (Caldwell 1988). It is an established feature of broader 
sociological research. However, within the field of strategic management it has gained little 
attention36.  
 
Across such research pluralism is seen as being far more than using a multi-method approach 
or multiple types of data. Instead, it is the recognition that differing ontological or 
epistemological viewpoints can bring deeper understanding (Samuels 1998, Watson 1990, 
Skrtic 1990, Midgley 2000).  Our focus in this article is on methodological pluralism, also 
called epistemological pluralism, where different valid theories of the same phenomena are 
used to gain insight about a hard to decern reality. So rather than ‘a plurality of worlds’, a 
plurality of hypotheses about ‘the one world’ (Maki 1997, Watson 1990).    
 
In methodological pluralism we can distinguish between complementary and competitive37 
approaches (Beckenbach 2020, Dobusch and Kapeller 2012, Maki 1997). So, either different 
compatible theories illuminate separate elements of a phenomena - what Maki (1997) terms a 
‘division of labour’ approach - or they provide contradictory explanations of the same 
element.  
 
The standard strategy paradigm represents an attempt at complementary pluralism. Here a 
monist view results from specific frameworks being positioned as the ‘right way’ to perform 
each stage of the process. However, as we have seen, major omissions and fundamental 
incompatibilities between the theories used blunts the value of this hybrid and can damage 
real life strategic decision-making (see figure 4).  
 
 
35 Also see Dow (2020) for a similar discussion on critical thinking and economics students  
36 See also Ghoshal’s (2005) wider argument for “re-legitimising” pluralism across management studies 
research and education. 




Where complexity and ambiguity are present and theories provide contradictory viewpoints, 
Dobusch and Kapeller (2014) suggest that competitive pluralism is a more valuable 
epistemology. This is plainly the case in strategy-making where ill-structured and 
multifaceted - “wicked” - problems are common-place (Schweiger, Sandberg and Ragan 
1986). Given the complexity of strategy development, rather than a consensus approach, 
Mitroff and Emshoff (1979) promote competitive pluralism as dialectic inquiry as a way to 
adequately test and challenge the root of any strategy. Drawing on Feyerabend38, they argue 
that it requires the deployment of well-confirmed, radically contrasting theories to maximise 
challenge and so penetrate deeply into the assumptions that underly prevailing thinking in the 
firm.    
 
Borrowing from the field of navigation, deeper understanding is being gained through 
triangulating across multiple contrasting ‘lines of position’ (Dobusch and Kapeller 2014, 
Caldwell 1988, Dow 2004, Olsen 2004, Jackson 1999)39. In strategy, the divergence between 
different schools of thought can be mobilised, as such lines of position, with insight generated 
by critically testing the contrasting hypotheses that each separate theory suggests40. You are 
using different theories in much the same way as scenario planning – with different future 
scenarios equally likely, each needs to be fully explored for the insight they give. Thus, as 
Barney and Mackey (2018) suggest, you would seek insight from both an ABV and a RBV 
analysis – expecting to conduct both rather than being able to select a “right theory”41. 
 
38 Feyerabend (2010, p20) suggests a methodology constituted by “a whole set of partly overlapping factually 
adequate, but mutually inconsistent theories”. 
39 In navigation a minimum of two lines of position – for example radio signals - are required, but to assess 
accuracy more will be gathered. The origins of each line need to be geographically separated otherwise the 
derived position will be inaccurate. Although strictly we might argue this is data triangulation rather than theory 
triangulation. Also see Downward and Mearman (2007) discussion of mixed-methods triangulation and 
retroduction. 
40 Taking a critical realist view point - each theory hypothesises a ‘generative mechanism’ that would explain 
sustained competitive advantage. 
41 Note Barney and MacKey (2018) restrict their discussion to Porter’s 1980s work (largely 5-forces rather than 
ABV) and view dynamic capabilities as an extension of RBV. They suggest using a pluralist approach where a 
firm does generate both monopoly profits and efficiency profits – i.e., where the firm has both positional and 
resource advantages – but in other circumstances you chose the right one. However, in reality there is often little 
clarity to make such a choice unless you first do both analyses and, even if the outcome is negative for both, 
then the decision-making team is better placed to make strategic decisions with insight from both. 
 
 
To do this, each theory needs to be explored openly and without prejudice – ‘let each theory’ 
speak – with each seen as an equally valid input to the strategy process. You want the full 
power of that lens generating insight - whether it produces a positive and negative result. For 
example, application of RBV may not show resources that pass the VRIO test but that is still 
valuable insight. The emphasis is on accommodating the different theories in the strategy 
conversation not integrating them in to a hybrid framework. So, seeing them as different 
voices, alongside those of managers, that offer varying interpretations of the situation 
confronted or different arguments on what the strategy should be (Morgan 1983, Skrtic 
1990)42.  
 
Such a pluralist paradigm does not imply relativism and an ‘anything goes’ approach43. As 
well as needing clear divergence between them, the individual theories used need to show 
proven internal coherency and practical applicability. So stood the test of rigorous peer 
review (Marques and Weisman 2008, Maki 1997, Powell 2001) 44. The limitations and 
weaknesses of particular theories need to be fully understood, but false synthesis in an 
attempt to compensate for weaknesses must be avoided45. The conflicts between theories are 
accepted for the sake of the insight they provide (Jackson 1999) 46. 
 
This triangulation approach to strategy theories in practice and education contrasts markedly 
with the monist view provided by the standard strategy paradigm. Instead of looking to force 
fit theories in to a hybrid based on elements that partially fit, the value comes from 
emphasising difference in the core underpinnings of each theory used (activities vs resources, 
equilibrium vs disequilibrium) (See Figure 5). In selecting between theory variants, rather 
than selectively bolting together bits of theory, you would look for marked divergence, for 
example, perhaps adopting Eisenhardt and Martin’s (2000) view of dynamic capabilities 
given its greater differences with the RBV theory, rather than (say) the view of Teece, et al’s 
(1997) (see figure 5) 47. 
 
 
42 What Skrtic (1990) describes as “social accommodation through dialogical discourse”. In this discourse you 
don’t try to reconcile the unreconcilable, but see inquiry in engagement with different viewpoints – 
”hermeneutic growth from being open to multiple perspectives”.  
43 Or as Samuels (1998, p301) terms it, “methodological anarchy”  
44 Dow (2004) using the term ‘structural pluralism’ – argues that in practice there are a limited number of 
approaches which can be sustained at any one time when theorists need to persuade at least some colleagues to 
support and publish that view, i.e., ‘in-theory’ falsifiability according to prevailing methodological norms in that 
field.  
45 This directly parallels Morgan’s (1983, 1986) metaphor approach in organisational analysis  
46 Dow (2004) makes this contrast in terms of closed and open systems. In a closed system all relevant variables 
can be identified, the boundaries are fixed and relationships between components are known. In an open system 
knowledge is held with uncertainty and there imperfect understanding of casual mechanisms in a complex 
system. “No one epistemology can be conclusively shown to be superior to all others in trying to establish 
reasoned conclusions about an open system reality” (Dow 2004, p283). Often the flaws in one theory or method 
are often the strengths in another (Denzin 1970) 
47 While the focus here is on sources of sustainable competitive advantage an equivalent view should be taken 




The competitive pluralist approach is a closer fit with strategy process in real life. In trying to 
peer through the fog of uncertainty and gain insight, different theories are essentially the 
strategist’s tool kit – or perhaps doctor’s medical bag - where each tool adds to the current 
diagnosis. Each artfully applied and the insights used to provoke new thinking or crystalise 
decisions48. In this there is flexibility in the use of a particular framework (Jarzabkowski and 
Kaplan 2015) but the underlying core assumptions of the theory need to be preserved so that 
contrast between lenses is maintained49. With the views of the decision-making team 
changing and developing over time, each application is not a ‘once-and-done’ event, different 




48 While practical constraints mean that to gain depth of insight it is important to focus on a particular lens at 
one point in time, comparisons and divergence from previous insights are flagged and used to prompt debate. 
49 The degree of flexibility that will be required will vary between practitioner, culture and situation but the field 
should aim to hold core principles in application (Jackson 1999, Mingers and Brocklesby 1996). Necessarily, 
practitioners and consultants will adapt and modify standard frameworks to fit local needs and the language 
used in the firm. The key is that these adaptations stay true to the underpinnings of the theory being used so that 
a ‘Frankenstein’ approach is avoided. See Denzin (1970) for a similar discussion in the field of sociological 
research. 
 
Experience as a practitioner suggests management teams can be uncomfortable where the 
emphasis appears to be on the theoretical frameworks itself. Hence engagement is often 
improved by focusing on the core idea lying at the heart of a theory (e.g., choice and activity 
alignment) and the insight being generated. With the strategy “story” that emerges the 
priority, the theory in-use itself is often made invisible to the decision-makers50. This places 
an onus on the strategist (perhaps strategy director) to ensure application stays true to the 
assumptions underlying whichever theory is being used and so ensured a contrasting 
perspective is brought into the light. To aid on this, consultants may be brought in to provide 
expertise in a particular methodology (e.g., Blue Ocean, scenario planning). 
 
Obviously, the unfolding conversation is as much a political process as it is interpretive – this 
should be no surprise (Pettigrew 1977). However, argument and conflict are a necessary 
element in fully exploring issues and achieving a collective intuition – the ‘organisational 
truce’ - that allows decisions to be taken and enacted (Eisenhardt, Kahwajy and Bourgeois 
1997, Nelson and Winter 1982, Schweiger et al 1986)51. The use of theories as a neutral, but 
challenging, ‘voice’ provides an environment within which a new truce can evolve, often 
with its own ‘in-firm’ language that persists far beyond a specific theory engagement episode. 
For example, a large UK insurance firm’s strategy became the “up-a-bit, left-a-bit strategy” 
following a scenario process, it was “jumping the straddle zone” from taking a Porterian view 
(although the theoretical origin was un-labelled at the time) and adopting “mountain lake” 
leadership behaviours stemmed from a Blue Ocean exercise. Particular theories may then be 
used to communicate and gain stakeholder support for particular decisions – although we 
should not automatically assume this post-rationalisation reflected practice.  
 
None of this sits comfortably with the current standard strategy paradigm. So, rather than 
presenting students with the notion that strategy is developed through an un-natural linear 
process, strategy educators have a duty to alert students to the reality of management (Bell et 
al 2018, Alstete and Beutell 2016, Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel 1998, Mintzberg and 
Gosling 2002) - and in this the utility of strategic frameworks - warts and all - as part of a 
complex organisational process (Jarzabkowski and Kaplan 2015).  So more effectively 
prepare students for the challenges of a business life. 
 
Some would argue that introducing pluralism in the teaching of strategy brings in too much 
complexity when students, new to the topic, need simplification. However, by removing the 
complexity and confusion introduced by force fitting theories together we in fact make the 
logic behind each theory far clearer. Stripping out attempts to blur differences and instead 
concentrating on the core essence of each theory is a route to simplification and makes them 
easier to teach and to understand52. 
 
Others will feel uncomfortable with not providing a simple recipe, a “best practice”, 
especially where students lack real-life experience (Schneider and Lieb 2004). As Samuels 
 
50 Experience suggests many management teams are uncomfortable where theoretical frameworks are presented 
and, hence, engagement is often improved where the focus is instead on the core idea (e.g., choice and activity 
alignment) and insight being generated. Unlike the formal dialectic inquiry proposed by Mitroff and Emshoff 
(1979), the challenging of underlying assumptions is often implicit in the engagement rather than explicit.  
51 A dialectical inquiry leads to more robust understanding and a testing of decisions (Schweiger et al 1986) with 
the discourse creating “community of agreement” (Von Glaserfield 1995) 
52 The focus here is on the use and teaching of strategy not research and theory development. Within schools of 
thought, theory needs to be continually improved even if this might mean convergence or divergence to/from 
other schools. Significant developments do need to be adopted in teaching (e.g., moving on with Porter from his 
‘generic strategies’ of the 1980s). Also see Nelson and Winter (1982 p46) on the separation of formal and 
appreciative theorising.  
 
(1998, p301) comments, pluralism can be uncomfortable for those who assume the existence 
of a given reality and want one correct theory. However, as we have seen, in real-life 
strategizing there is ambiguity and the notion of a “right answer” does not exist53. Hence 
students are ill-served by being encouraged in the pretence that there is such a thing (De Witt 
2017, Bell et al 2018, Dow 2020)54. This does not mean that there is no right and wrong 
within what is taught. Students do need to develop a depth of understanding of different 
theoretical standpoints - how they differ and their limitations - and the best practice of each’s 
application.  
 
Since 2018, such a pluralist paradigm has been applied across a number of strategy modules 
at undergraduate, MBA and executive levels. The teaching of over 3,500 students in the UK 
and elsewhere in the world has been switched to this approach with assessments case study 
and simulation based. Greater clarity on individual theories and their application55, as well as 
pedagogy in use, has resulted in average mark improvements, fewer fails and increased 
student satisfaction. Notably the approach has been seen to accommodates a broad range of 
student attainment levels. While better students can embrace a critical multi-lens approach in 
their analysis, others can focus on showing understanding and application of the specific 
single theory highlighted in an exam question or assignment.   
 
Use with executive students from public services and other non-profit organisations also 
suggest less dissonance than is typical with the traditional strategy paradigm. As shown 
elsewhere in the literature, consideration of unique resources and alignment of activities 
provide valuable insights no matter the type of organisation (Hansen and Ferlie 2016)56. 
However, for managers from non-profit organisations this value is often obscured by a 
narrow conception of competition and emphasis on commercial success inherent within the 
traditional strategy paradigm. By focusing on the underlying essence of specific theories 
(e.g., choice and alignment, unique valuable resources) students realise how valuable insights 





In this paper we have seen how the standard strategy paradigm that is found is in many 
strategy courses and text books is embarrassingly at odds with the reality of strategy practice 
and the underpinnings of the core theories it selectively assimilates. With many traditional 
recipes for advantage waning, practitioners need the full power of key theories to aid their 
decision-making and hence the issues with the traditional paradigm have become a concern. 
To harness the richness of strategy theories, students and practitioners need a deep 
understanding of the core underpinnings of each theory. This requires acceptance of the 
fundamental differences in the assumptions behind each, differences that have largely been 
ignored or skated over in strategy courses and text books.  
 
53 Paralleling Samuels’ (1998 p301) statement about economics, strategy theories and a firm’s strategy are 
“socially constructed: made, not found”. The is no meta-criteria by which to choose between theories. 
54 There is agreement here with De Witt (2017) to avoid offering just two theories as this encourages the 
development of preference rather than treating each with equal merit. However, there is also a challenge to De 
Witt’s own approach of providing a compromise perspective in each of the debates he covers – this can lead to 
students seeing this as a false synthesis.  
55 Depending on the cohort and programme of study, between 2 and 4 study units are used to cover a range of 
contrasting views on competitive advantage – students usually receiving a 1-hour lecture/lecture equivalent and 
2-hour application workshop for each study unit. 
56 We have noted that Porter’s more recent statements of an activity-based view (aka Porter Mk II) resonate far 
more strongly with executive students from public services than his generic strategies ever did. 
 
 
A focus on the core underpinnings of strategy theories and differences between them is 
challenged by some of the developments seen in different schools of thought. In efforts to 
broaden appeal and respond to criticisms, key premise regarding the basic building blocks of 
strategy become blurred and internal consistency reduced. While such developments may be 
academically appealing and suggest progress towards a universal strategy framework, the 
blurring that results, increases complexity (and so reduces ease of understanding) and dilutes 
the power of a theory in its use. Notably, some authors, such as Porter and Barney, have 
recognised this and refocused to their original positions.  
 
With the traditional paradigm failing to mobilise the richness of individual strategy theories, 
it is argued that a methodological pluralist approach to teaching and practice provides an 
attractive alternative that fits more closely with real world strategy-making - at least until a 
suitable universal theory emerges – if ever! While the focus here has been on business 
strategy and the sources of competitive advantage, the same argument can be made regarding 
the wider field of strategic management, for example differing views on the responsibilities 
of the firm. The application of a set of divergent schools of thought each with differing, but 
internally consistent, underlying assumptions injects deeper insight into the ongoing strategy 
conversation that is the reality in effective organisations. 
 
Such a pluralist approach has a number of implications for teaching. Strategy courses and text 
books need to be structured so students explore different perspectives. While areas of 
consistency need to be covered, the aim should be to build understanding of key differences 
and how application of each can generate insight. Such an approach does not imply that 
“anything goes” as a deep understanding of the core of each theory is needed as well as its    
strengths and the relevant criticisms. Assessment needs to be targeted at students 
demonstrating their understanding the core assumptions of each theory and their ability to 
apply it. Better students would be expected to critically explore the contrast between theories 
and the different insights that result from the application of each. 
 
While some may wonder if this approach increases the complexity of the topic, the reverse is 
in fact the case. By avoiding false integration and not blurring core assumptions, simplicity 
beyond complexity is more likely to be achieved. Indeed, application over a number of years 
has shown it to be a pragmatic approach that develops deeper student understanding at both 
undergraduate and MBA levels – including executive students from public services and non-
commercial organisations. The removal of the complexity found within the traditional 
strategy paradigm also enables educators to ensure that the latest developments in a particular 
school of thought are covered. After 50 years of criticism, to finally move on from SWOT 
and generic strategies, and so better equipping students for their careers. 
 
The pluralist approach described also opens the door, to greater diversity in teaching and 
practice. The potential to give space to new and emerging views that perhaps focus on 
different basic building blocks of strategy. Although to avoid anarchy, a critical approach 
needs to be maintained with emphasis placed on application as well as understanding. As 
Caldwell (1988, p 235) urges: “Seek novelty and try to reduce it through criticism”- so, both 
practice and scholarship matter! The “narrative turn” explored by Fenton and Langley (2011), 
Jacobides (2010) and Barry and Elmes (1997), where story lines and sub plots are the basic 
building block, may be an example. The long running methodological pluralism debate 
within economics may also be a source of valuable new perspectives (e.g., feminist, 
postcolonial and ecological economists) that contrast with the neo-classical and Austrian 
influences we already see. 
 
 
In a post-Covid world with high levels of uncertainty and change, that is still dealing with the 
aftershocks of economic crises, practitioners need to deploy the full power of strategy theory. 
However, as Caldwell (1988 p238) argues a monist view that fails to recognise the diversity 
and richness of the theories that exist, and even clings to some practices that cannot be 
applied, is an untenable position. The field of strategy is rich in theories and has borrowed 
deep insight from the fields of economics, philosophy and sociology. However, to mobilise 
that depth, to access the needed simplicity beyond complexity, we must embrace difference 
as much as consistency. 
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